

## ACADEMIC POSITIONS

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- **Department of Politics, Princeton University** New Jersey, U.S.A.  
*Postdoctoral Associate- Formal Theory and Quantitative Methods Group* 2023 (September)- present

## EDUCATION

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- **University of British Columbia** 6000 Iona Drive, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada  
*Ph.D. Economics, Fields: Industrial Organization, Political Economy and Marketing* 2017 - 2023(exp)  
*Committee: Matilde Bombardini, Vitor Farinha Luz, Paul Schrimpf and Francesco Trebbi*
- **Indian Statistical Institute** 7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi, India  
*Masters in Quantitative Economics* 2015 - 2017  
*Advisors: Arunava Sen and Debasis Mishra.*
- **Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi** University Enclave, Delhi, India  
*Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in Economics* 2012-2015

## PAPERS

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### Working Papers

#### [Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication](#)

#### [Job Market Paper](#)

Political rallies have formed a large part of U.S. electoral campaigns since the 19th century and remain relevant today. This paper models candidates' rally decisions as an empirical dynamic game of electoral competition and applies it to estimate rally effectiveness for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The model supports three empirically observed patterns, such as candidates concentrating rallies in states with neck and neck competition as election approaches. Estimates uncover that rallies by presidential candidates were effective in increasing their poll margins and these effects remain significant across multiple robustness tests. The estimates also reveal that a rally by a presidential candidate is more persuasive than a television ad. I construct and execute model selection tests that infer whether candidates are strategic and forward-looking to validate model assumptions. Counterfactual exercises show that Trump's rallies were electorally pivotal, while rallies by other candidates had no effect on their chances of winning. The effects of short-term campaign silences (i.e. forbidding political campaigning) are limited since candidates can gain sufficient support from the electorate before they begin.

#### [Do Political Parties Value Government Portfolios Symmetrically? Evidence from European Parliaments 1965-2018](#)

While studying government formation in parliamentary democracies, researchers have always assumed that political parties possess symmetric preferences over government portfolios. This assumption constitutes a foundational element for economic and political science frameworks that use "division of a pie" problems to analyze government formation. This paper shows horizontal differentiation among government portfolios in Western European Parliaments from 1965-2018 in two major steps. First, novel empirical patterns show that right-party politicians were more likely to be the Minister of Defense, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Justice, and Prime Minister. At the same time, the left was more likely to be allocated to Labor, Environment, Health, Science and Technology, Education, and Transport departments. In the second step, party preferences are estimated as the function of their ideology by modeling this strategic interaction as a Colonel-Blotto game. The model provides one with a prediction about "who gets what?" which is exploited to uncover party preferences as a function of party ideology. Counterfactual experiments uncover the proportion of allocations that can be explained by heterogeneous preferences and the loss in surplus caused by strategic interactions.

#### [Rallies and Popularity: The Case of Indian Parliamentary Elections](#)

The paper constructs a model of dynamic electoral competition where politicians compete against each other to stay popular on election day. The model possesses a finite time horizon with a perfect information structure which results in a unique equilibrium—a contribution in itself. An extensive simulation study is conducted to understand the model's comparative statics, which provides essential intuition that can be used to explain the electoral phenomenon. The model is applied the 2019 Indian General Election to test how fairly it performs. This paper also provides one of the first examinations of Modi rallies that helps us to get a sense of how effective Modi rallies were in the 2019 Indian General Elections.

## Work in Progress

### **Reducing the Gender GAP towards a More Representative Democracy**

with [Amanda de Albuquerque](#), [Frederico Finan](#), [Laura Karpuska](#), [Francesco Trebbi](#)

The goal of this project is to study the demand-side factors that affect voting for female candidates in Brazil. Most standard voting models assume that voters evaluate candidates along several dimensions when deciding for whom to vote. These dimensions often include the candidate's Gender, their perceived Ability, and their Policy positions, (GAP). We have developed a structural model based on these three dimensions to decouple their effects on voting decisions. Importantly, our framework can separately identify the roles of preferences versus beliefs of individual voters in this multidimensional decision. To estimate our model, we have designed a randomized control trial (RCT) that exploits a social media

app's capabilities to micro-target individual voters with messages in the form of ads. Our experiment will consist of several gender-specific treatments that will vary in their level of informativeness. This distinction in informativeness across messages is key for isolating changes in salience and beliefs about a particular candidate's dimension (e.g., gender, ability, and policy). It will also allow us to recover any learning effects on the voter side without relying on survey-based methods. We will run our experiment in the weeks just before the 2024 municipio elections in Brazil at a sufficiently large geographical scale to detect effects on aggregate vote shares. Currently, we are running our Pilot in the 2022 Brazillian State elections. A critical empirical contribution of this work will be its ability to disentangle which dimensions matter the most for voters when choosing a candidate and how gender (both of the candidate and of the voter) plays a role in this choice. Campaigns to promote gender representation require a clear understanding of the roots of underrepresentation to be effective.

### The Distortionary Effect of Third Party Advertising in the U.S. Congressional Elections

I study the loss of more able but less funded politicians due to high levels of advertising by political parties and outside groups for the case of the U.S. congressional elections. The U.S. congressional elections periodically observe enormous spending on T.V. ads sponsored by politicians, political parties, and outside groups. In such a scenario, upcoming politicians are forced to compete against the significant advertising levels by opposing parties and outside groups. These advertising levels by outside groups and political parties act as a barrier to entry for politicians, limiting who can contest the election. Moreover, these can result in the adverse selection of low-ability but strongly funded politicians. In this project, I plan to estimate the counterfactual ability distribution of politicians in the absence of advertising by parties and outside groups. Comparing the observed level of ability distribution and the counterfactual ability distribution can help us pin down the loss of able politicians. These estimates will be helpful for recommending policy interventions such as spending caps or complete to a partial ban on T.V. ads by parties and outside groups.

### PRESENTATIONS (INCLUDING FOTHCOMING)

2023	IIES Stockholm University (scheduled), Political Economy Rookiefest (Northwestern University, scheduled), University of Warwick, University of Queensland, Queen's University, Syracuse University.
2022	Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics (accepted), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC), Applied Young Economist Webinar, New York State Economic Association (accepted), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Euroasian Business and Economic Society (2022), Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC)
2021	C.D.E Delhi School of Economics and The Econometric Society Meeting (accepted), Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC)

### TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Course	Evaluation (out of 5.0)	Year
<i>Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence)</i> Econ 600	4.8	2018
<i>Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence)</i> Econ 600	4.5	2019
<i>Principles of Microeconomics</i> Econ 101- L01,L03	4.5, 4.3	2021
<i>Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-I</i> Econ 304	4.8	2021
<i>Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-I</i> Econ 305	4.7	2021
<i>Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-II</i> Econ 306	5	2022
<i>Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-II</i> Econ 307	5	2022

## HONORS AND AWARDS

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<b>Third Runner Up</b> at 41st Euroasian Business and Economics Society Conference-Berlin	2022
<b>Graduate Support Initiative</b> , University of British Columbia	2017-2021
<b>President's Academic Excellence Initiative PhD Award</b> , University of British Columbia	2020-2022
<b>International Student Award</b> , University of British Columbia	2017-2022
<b>Best Student in 1st Year Econometrics Class</b> , University of British Columbia	2018
<b>Masters Student Fellowship</b> , Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi	2015-2017

## SKILLS SUMMARY

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- **Programming:** R, Matlab, Stata, Julia, Latex, Python
- **Languages:** Hindi (Native), English (Fluent)

## CITIZENSHIP

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Indian

## DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH

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9th October 1993 in Delhi, Delhi, India

## REFERENCES

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### [Matilde Bombardini](#)

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University of California, Berkeley  
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### [Paul Schrimpf](#) (Co-chair)

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