

Anubhav Jha



✉ : aj7954@princeton.edu
✉ : anubhavpcjha@gmail.com

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

- **Department of Politics, Princeton University** New Jersey, U.S.A.
Postdoctoral Research Associate- Formal Theory and Quantitative Methods Group 2023 (September)- present

EDUCATION

- **University of British Columbia** Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
Ph.D. Economics, Fields: Industrial Organization, Political Economy and Marketing 2017 - 2023 (July)
Committee: [Matilde Bombardini](#), [Vitor Farinha Luz](#), [Paul Schrimpf](#) and [Francesco Trebbi](#)
- **Indian Statistical Institute** New Delhi, India
Masters in Quantitative Economics 2015 - 2017
Advisors: [Arunava Sen](#) and [Debasis Mishra](#).
- **Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi** Delhi, India
Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in Economics 2012-2015

REFERENCES

[Siwan Anderson](#)

Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
6000 Iona Drive
Vancouver B.C. V6T 1L4
Email: siwan.anderson@ubc.ca

[Matias Iaryczower](#)

Department of Politics
Princeton University
Fisher Hall
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Email: miarycz@princeton.edu

[Paul Schrimpf](#)

Vancouver School of Economics
University of British Columbia
6000 Iona Drive
Vancouver B.C. V6T 1L4
Email: schrimpf@mail.ubc.ca

[Francesco Trebbi](#)

Haas School of Business
University of California, Berkeley
2220 Piedmont Ave.
Berkeley, CA 94720 United States
Email: ftrebbi@berkeley.edu

PAPERS

Working Papers

[Discrimination or Ambition: What Drives Underrepresentation in the U.S. House?](#)

[Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication](#)

[Do Political Parties Value Government Portfolios Symmetrically? Evidence from European Parliaments 1965-2018](#)

[Rallies and Popularity: The Case of Indian Parliamentary Elections](#)

Work in Progress

Reducing the Gender GAP towards a More Representative Democracy

with [Amanda de Albuquerque](#), [Frederico Finan](#), [Laura Karpuska](#), [Francesco Trebbi](#)

Aspiration Based Scapegoating and Anti-Immigration Sentiments in the U.S.

with [Siwan Anderson](#), [Garance Genicot](#), [Debraj Ray](#)

Judicial Information Acquisition Under Meritocratic Promotions

with [Leopoldo Gutierrez](#), [Matias Iaryczower](#), [Yuhan Zheng](#)

How uncertain revenue streams have influenced media slant in the Indian print media?

with [Sabyasachi Das](#), [Shresth Garg](#), [Sagar Saxena](#)

Voting cost and platform position taking in the U.S. Senatorial Elections

with Gleason Judd and Riley Steel

PRESENTATIONS

2024	APSA 2024, 35th International Conference on Game Theory (Stony Brook), SAET-24
2023	AECGD ISI-D, Delhi Winter School (DSE), Stockholm School of Economics, IIES Stockholm University, Political Economy Rookiefest (Northwestern University), University of Warwick, University of Queensland, Queen's University, Syracuse University.
2022	Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics (accepted), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC), Applied Young Economist Webinar, New York State Economic Association (accepted), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Euroasian Business and Economic Society (2022), Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC) C.D.E Delhi School of Economics and The Econometric Society Meeting (accepted)
2021	Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC)

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Course	Evaluation (out of 5.0)	Year
<i>Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence) Econ 600</i>	4.8	2018
<i>Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence) Econ 600</i>	4.5	2019
<i>Principles of Microeconomics Econ 101- L01,L03</i>	4.5, 4.3	2021
<i>Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-I Econ 304</i>	4.8	2021
<i>Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-I Econ 305</i>	4.7	2021
<i>Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-II Econ 306</i>	5	2022
<i>Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-II Econ 307</i>	5	2022

HONORS AND AWARDS

Best Paper Award: <i>Delhi Winter School (Econometric Society, DSE, CDE)</i>	2023
Graduate Support Initiative: <i>University of British Columbia</i>	2017-2021
President's Academic Excellence Initiative PhD Award: <i>University of British Columbia</i>	2020-2022
International Student Award: <i>University of British Columbia</i>	2017-2022
Best Student in 1st Year Econometrics Class: <i>University of British Columbia</i>	2018
Masters Student Fellowship: <i>Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi</i>	2015-2017

REFEREEING

Econometrica (2), Social Choice and Welfare (1)

SKILLS SUMMARY

- **Programming:** R, Python, Julia, Matlab, Stata, Latex
- **Languages:** Hindi (Native), English (Fluent)

[Discrimination or Ambition: What Drives Underrepresentation in the U.S. House?](#)

Job Market Paper

The underrepresentation of minorities in key government bodies persists across all democratic institutions. For the U.S. House, scholars have identified two leading causes: voter discrimination and election aversion (lower political ambition), which are difficult to isolate from one another. To address this, the paper structurally estimates a model of political entry, voter discrimination, and campaign spending to separate the role of voter discrimination from that of election aversion in explaining underrepresentation. The framework also differentiates discrimination in primaries from that in general elections by modeling both stages. I find that the most significant driver of underrepresentation in the U.S. House is the discrimination practiced by primary voters. While lower political ambition exists among underrepresented groups and they face discrimination by general election voters, these factors explain only a negligible degree of underrepresentation. Policy counterfactual experiments suggest that campaign support during primaries and seat reservations for underrepresented groups can substantially improve representation for both Democrats and Republicans. Meanwhile, campaign support during general elections has minimal effects.

[Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication](#)

Political rallies constitute a large part of electoral campaigning in the U.S. and in modern democracies since the 19th century and remain a salient politico-economic phenomenon today. This paper accounts for candidates' strategic decisions to rally as a finite-horizon dynamic game of electoral competition and applies it to structurally estimate rally spatial and temporal choices by candidates. For the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections, we show that rallies substantially increase poll margin leads in targeted constituencies over non-rallying opponents and trigger systematic dynamic responses by opponents. In terms of magnitudes, rallies by presidential candidates are more persuasive than television ads, and estimates of the gross effect show that President Trump's rallies were in fact electorally pivotal. Instead, rallies by all other candidates did not change their win probability. Counterfactual policy experiments reveal that the effects of short-term campaign silences (i.e., electoral blackouts) are limited since candidates can time their rallies and gain sufficient support from the electorate before campaign silences begin.

[Do Political Parties Value Government Portfolios Symmetrically? Evidence from European Parliaments 1965-2018](#)

While studying government formation in parliamentary democracies, researchers have always assumed that political parties possess symmetric preferences over government portfolios. This assumption constitutes a foundational element for economic and political science frameworks that use "division of a pie" problems to analyze government formation. This paper shows horizontal differentiation among government portfolios in Western European Parliaments from 1965-2018 in two major steps. First, novel empirical patterns show that right-party politicians were more likely to be the Minister of Defense, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Justice, and Prime Minister. At the same time, the left was more likely to be allocated to Labor, Environment, Health, Science and Technology, Education, and Transport departments. In the second step, party preferences are estimated as the function of their ideology by modeling this strategic interaction as a Colonel-Blotto game. The model provides one with a prediction about "who gets what?" which is exploited to uncover party preferences as a function of party ideology. Counterfactual experiments uncover the proportion of allocations that can be explained by heterogeneous preferences and the loss in surplus caused by strategic interactions.

[Rallies and Popularity: The Case of Indian Parliamentary Elections](#)

The paper constructs a model of dynamic electoral competition where politicians compete against each other to stay popular on election day. The model possesses a finite time horizon with a perfect information structure which results in a unique equilibrium—a contribution in itself. An extensive simulation study is conducted to understand the model's comparative statics, which provides essential intuition that can be used to explain the electoral phenomenon. The model is applied the 2019 Indian General Election to test how fairly it performs. This paper also provides one of the first examinations of Modi rallies that helps us to get a sense of how effective Modi rallies were in the 2019 Indian General Elections.

Reducing the Gender GAP towards a More Representative Democracy

with [Amanda de Albuquerque](#), [Frederico Finan](#), [Laura Karpuska](#), [Francesco Trebbi](#)

We study the demand-side factors that affect voting for female candidates in Brazil. Most standard voting models assume that voters evaluate candidates along several dimensions when deciding whom to vote for. These dimensions often include the candidate's gender, perceived ability, and policy positions (GAP). We developed a structural model based on these three dimensions to disentangle their effects on voting decisions. Importantly, our framework can separately identify the roles of

preferences and beliefs of individual voters in this multidimensional decision. To estimate our model, we conducted a large-scale randomized controlled trial (RCT) across 1,000 municipalities in Brazil for the October 2024 elections, leveraging a social media app's ability to micro-target individual voters with ads. Our experiment consisted of several gender-specific treatments that varied in their level of informativeness. This variation in informativeness was key for isolating changes in salience and beliefs regarding a particular candidate's dimension (e.g., gender, ability, and policy). It also enabled us to identify any learning effects on the voter side without relying on survey-based methods.

Aspiration Based Scapegoating and Anti-Immigration Sentiments in the U.S.

with [Siwan Anderson](#), [Garance Genicot](#), [Debraj Ray](#)

We study identity-based reactions to economic disparities in the context of anti-immigration attitudes in the United States. To understand this, we have developed a structural model based on the frameworks of Ray (2006) and Genicot and Ray (2017). A key feature of these models is that rising aspirations can both inspire and frustrate. For example, if an individual's economic status exceeds their social aspirations, they may increase monetary investments, potentially benefiting future generations. However, if aspirations rise beyond what can feasibly be achieved or become too costly, this may lead to frustration and a decline in economic investment. Consequently, resources may be redirected toward identity-based pursuits. This perspective suggests that the intensified focus on identity advancement results from unmet economic aspirations. We will perform a structural estimation of the model to quantify how frustrated aspirations in the context of rising inequality contribute to the increase in identity-based pursuits. We aim to measure these latter pursuits by changes in anti-immigrant attitudes in the U.S. and the former by their monetary savings decisions. Our structural estimation will allow us to not only test the hypothesized theoretical framework, but it will also help us identify the potential effects of redistribution policies within this framework, so as to make policy relevant predictions with regards to reducing these negative societal consequences.

Judicial Information Acquisition Under Meritocratic Promotions

with [Leopoldo Gutierrez](#), [Matias Iaryczower](#), [Yuhan Zheng](#)

We have collected data spanning 13 years from the Court of Justice of São Paulo, where we observe promotion outcomes, whether promotions were based on seniority or merit, the number of cases closed by judges, the number of hearings held, and the hierarchy of judges each quarter. Our findings indicate that the higher the ranking of judges in cumulative closed cases, the higher their probability of promotion tends to be. Moreover, the additional number of cases a judge closes decreases as their seniority ranking increases. These findings point out that the rate at which judges close cases depends on their anticipated probability of promotion. We will structurally estimate the case-closing decisions made by judges at various stages of their tenure to empirically test whether these facts arise from judges inflating their perceived merit by prematurely closing cases (without acquiring the socially optimal level of information) or whether merit-based promotions succeed in increasing the productivity of public servants.

How uncertain revenue streams have influenced media slant in the Indian print media?

with [Sabyasachi Das](#), [Shresth Garg](#), [Sagar Saxena](#)

We study the Indian print media industry, specifically analyzing how individual newspaper's profit maximizing incentives influences their editorial decisions. We are collecting data on political articles published in Indian newspapers, covering both English and regional languages. We will use the content of the news article headlines to construct a time-varying index of media slant for each newspaper, spanning both the UPA and NDA government years. This data source can help one to answer multiple questions. First, it can address the trade-off newspapers face when optimally allocating space for government ads and determining the extent to which their reporting is critical of the sitting government. Second, we aim to investigate how much bargaining power the government holds in determining both the amount of ad space sold to newspapers and the prices for that space, while also influencing the newspaper's slant. Is a more favorable slant compensated by higher ad revenue, or can the government easily dictate the slant with minimal monetary compensation? A third question explores how electoral incentives influence the amount of ads purchased, specifically what percentage of the government sponsored ads are electorally motivated and what percentage of the ads are not.