Anubhav Jha

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Academic Positions

- **Department of Politics, Princeton University** — New Jersey, U.S.A.
  Postdoctoral Research Associate- Formal Theory and Quantitative Methods Group — *2023 (September)- present*

Education

- **University of British Columbia** — Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada
  Ph.D. Economics, Fields: Industrial Organization, Political Economy and Marketing — *2017 - 2023 (July)*
  Committee: Matilde Bombardini, Vitor Farinha Luz, Paul Schrimpf and Francesco Trebbi

- **Indian Statistical Institute** — New Delhi, India
  Masters in Quantitative Economics — *2015 - 2017*
  Advisors: Arunava Sen and Debasis Mishra.

- **Kirori Mal College, University of Delhi** — Delhi, India
  Bachelor of Arts (Hons.) in Economics — *2012-2015*

Papers

Working Papers

Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication

Do Political Parties Value Government Portfolios Symmetrically? Evidence from European Parliaments 1965-2018

Rallies and Popularity: The Case of Indian Parliamentary Elections

Work in Progress

Reducing the Gender GAP towards a More Representative Democracy
with Amanda de Albuquerque, Frederico Finan, Laura Karpuska, Francesco Trebbi

Screening For Influence: Latent Effects of Campaigning and Institutional Design

Aspiration Based Scapegoating and Anti-Immigration Sentiments in the U.S.
with Siwan Anderson, Garance Genicot, Debraj Ray

Judicial Information Acquisition Under Meritocratic Promotions
with Leopoldo Gutierre, Matias Iaryczower, Yuhan Zheng

A Barter of Ads and Slant: '*Murdochization*' of Indian Newspapers via Government Sponsored Ads
with Sabyasachi Das

Presentations

2024	SAET-24
2023	AECGD ISI-D, Delhi Winter School (DSE), Stockholm School of Economics, IIES Stockholm University, Political Economy Rookiefest (Northwestern University), University of Warwick, University of Queensland, Queen's University, Syracuse University.
2022	Econometric Society Summer School in Dynamic Structural Econometrics (accepted), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC), Applied Young Economist Webinar, New York State Economic Association (accepted), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Euroasian Business and Economic Society (2022), Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC) C.D.E Delhi School of Economics and The Econometric Society Meeting (accepted)
2021	Informal Micro-Theory Workshop (UBC), Econometrics Lunch (UBC), Dev/PE Brown Bag (UBC)

Teaching Experience

Course	Evaluation (out of 5.0)	Year
Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence) Econ 600	4.8	2018
Microeconomics-I (Ph.D. sequence) Econ 600	4.5	2019
Principles of Microeconomics Econ 101- L01,L03	4.5, 4.3	2021
Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-I Econ 304	4.8	2021
Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-I Econ 305	4.7	2021
Intermediate Microeconomics (Hons.)-II Econ 306	5	2022
Intermediate Macroeconomics (Hons.)-II Econ 307	5	2022

Honors and Awards

Best Paper Award Delhi Winter School (Econometric Society, DSE, CDE) 2023
Third Runner Up at 41st Euroasian Business and Economics Society Conference-Berlin 2022
Graduate Support Initiative, University of British Columbia 2017-2021
President's Academic Excellence Initiative PhD Award, University of British Columbia 2020-2022
International Student Award, University of British Columbia 2017-2022
Best Student in 1st Year Econometrics Class, University of British Columbia 2018
Masters Student Fellowship, Indian Statistical Institute-Delhi 2015-2017

Skills Summary

- **Programming**: R, Matlab, Stata, Julia, Latex, Python
- **Languages**: Hindi (Native), English (Fluent)

Citizenship

Indian

Date and Place of Birth

9th October 1993 in Delhi, Delhi, India

References

Matilde Bombardini
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University of California, Berkeley
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Abstracts For Working Papers

Rally The Vote: Electoral Competition With Direct Campaign Communication **Job Market Paper**

Political rallies have formed a large part of U.S. electoral campaigns since the 19th century and remain relevant today. This paper models candidates' rally decisions as an empirical dynamic game of electoral competition and applies it to estimate rally effectiveness for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. presidential elections. The model supports three empirically observed patterns, such as candidates concentrating rallies in states with neck and neck competition as election approaches. Estimates uncover that rallies by presidential candidates were effective in increasing their poll margins and these effects remain significant across multiple robustness tests. The estimates also reveal that a rally by a presidential candidate is more persuasive than a television ad. I construct and execute model selection tests that infer whether candidates are strategic and forward-looking to validate model assumptions. Counterfactual exercises show that TrumpâĂŹs rallies were electorally pivotal, while rallies by other candidates had

no effect on their chances of winning. The effects of short-term campaign silences (i.e. forbidding political campaigning) are limited since candidates can gain sufficient support from the electorate before they begin.

Do Political Parties Value Government Portfolios Symmetrically? Evidence from European Parliaments 1965-2018

While studying government formation in parliamentary democracies, researchers have always assumed that political parties possess symmetric preferences over government portfolios. This assumption constitutes a foundational element for economic and political science frameworks that use "division of a pie" problems to analyze government formation. This paper shows horizontal differentiation among government portfolios in Western European Parliaments from 1965-2018 in two major steps. First, novel empirical patterns show that right-party politicians were more likely to be the Minister of Defense, Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Justice, and Prime Minister. At the same time, the left was more likely to be allocated to Labor, Environment, Health, Science and Technology, Education, and Transport departments. In the second step, party preferences are estimated as the function of their ideology by modeling this strategic interaction as a Colonel-Blotto game. The model provides one with a prediction about "who gets what?âĂİ which is exploited to uncover party preferences as a function of party ideology. Counterfactual experiments uncover the proportion of allocations that can be explained by heterogeneous preferences and the loss in surplus caused by strategic interactions.

Rallies and Popularity: The Case of Indian Parliamentary Elections

The paper constructs a model of dynamic electoral competition where politicians compete against each other to stay popular on election day. The model possesses a finite time horizon with a perfect information structure which results in a unique equilibrium— a contribution in itself. An extensive simulation study is conducted to understand the model's comparative statics, which provides essential intuition that can be used to explain the electoral phenomenon. The model is applied the 2019 Indian General Election to test how fairly it performs. This paper also provides one of the first examinations of Modi rallies that helps us to get a sense of how effective Modi rallies were in the 2019 Indian General Elections.